The “Retail Problem” in Public Education

I RARELY VENTURE outside my core expertise in this blog for (justifiable!) fear of embarrassing myself and those close to me. But I’ve been watching an important societal trend from the sidelines with increasing concern. The topic is public education policy, and the lens through which I view it is the local school system here in Tucson, AZ.

Like I said – that’s a topic that would normally be out of my league. Better left to the experts. Or so I believed, until in a recent flash of insight I realized that our public schools have a retail problem.

Now there’s a subject area I know something about. Maybe in the next few paragraphs I can make a useful contribution to the national dialog on a very troubling issue. I doubt I could make things worse.

Education’s retail problem, in a nutshell, is what we in the stack-it-high-watch-it-fly business of selling stuff call over-storing. Over-storing occurs when retailers build too many buildings to offer goods to a finite number of shoppers. When the ratio of selling space to available dollars gets too high, all the stores suffer for a while, and eventually some go out of business until balance is restored.

This is easy to understand in terms of macroeconomics 101: Too many goods chasing too few dollars results in a lowering of demand.

Today we have a parallel situation in the world of public education due in part to national and local education policy, part due to the current economy, and part due to enduring human nature. The problem is especially acute this year here in Tucson, where there are too many classrooms chasing too few students, resulting in a lowering of demand. In fact, I’d nominate this city’s Tucson Unified School District (TUSD) as the nation’s poster child for over-schooling.

TUSD is presently battered by a perfect storm of negative trends, beginning with historically low funding per student (49th of the 50 states) and exacerbated by recent cuts due to the generally poor local economy. Teacher salaries are an embarrassment. There’s little money for textbooks or paper. Non-core subjects like music, art and P.E. have been largely eliminated. The Federal “No Child Gets Ahead” mandate has required further costly focus on teach-to-the-test classroom tactics.

Adding to this storm is Arizona’s status as the national hotbed of so-called “charter schools,” those privately operated institutions that operate by re-purposing per child state funds. These are often heaped with praise in Washington based on a persistent (but largely baseless) belief that charter schools introduce healthy competition to the educational system that will ultimately raise public school standards and benefit our children.

If there is one thing that TUSD has in profusion today, it is classrooms. The district operates more than 100 elementary, middle and high schools, plus several alternative schools, serving about 55,800 students, for an average of 558 students per building. That average is declining, as more students depart the district each year to attend local charter schools.

The result is some devastating math. Fewer students per school means declining revenues. but the same number of buildings to operate with fixed costs translates into a decline in net spending per student and a loss of classroom and non-classroom jobs.

This is a contributing factor in the elimination of non-core teachers and courses. Naturally, core classes must be preserved to meet state and federal standards. When teaching jobs are cut further, class size must increase, even if classrooms stand empty.

Another wrinkle has to do with exactly which families are shifting their students out of the public schools and into charter schools or other alternatives. Teachers I know observe that the parents who make this decision tend to be more involved with their children’s education and more likely to set high standards for their children. While the evidence is anecdotal, if true this amounts to a flight of the better and brighter away from the public schools. The unintended but devastating consequence of their departure is a lowering of average standardized test scores, evidence which is used to rate and reward schools and teachers.

This impact is demoralizing for teachers and alarming for parents, who respond by transferring more of their children into charter schools each term. But the district’s costs for owning and operating the buildings remain the same; more teacher jobs are lost each year; and the net spending per student continues to creep downward.

One obvious solution for an embattled district like TUSD, that would partially relieve the pressure on operating costs, would be to close some of its superfluous schools and consolidate the children into those that remain. In fact, closure of several smaller elementary schools has been proposed each of the past several years. Vocal local parent groups, who moved into those neighborhoods to be near these schools, successfully quashed these decisions.

Very recently we have heard news from the district of several proposed (and at least one actual) school mergers – whereby two half-empty elementary schools are combined into one with the superfluous building  shuttered. In the one announced instance so far, the parents of both schools voted in favor of the change. This is a bit like closing down one of several chain stores when the demographics shift – some business may be lost, but on the whole, the remaining units are more profitable.

So maybe TUSD got that part of the lesson. Lower costs begin with fewer buildings. Unfortunately, with state funding dropping even faster, this instance of economic realism will not be sufficient to forestall even more draconian cuts. How sad for our young people and the dedicated teachers who until recently believed they could make a difference in their lives.

© Copyright 2010 James Tenser

“Plan Through Impact”: Dialog with Dawson

Plan Through Impact

Tenser’s Tirades recently sat down with Warren Dawson, President of consultancy Dawson Thoughtware, for a conversation about his vision for a comprehensive framework for what he calls Merchandising Resource Management, designed to support superior store-level compliance and effective measurement methods, from initial plans to their ultimate impact on business. The MRM process allows retailers and suppliers to set objectives, measure performance at each process stage, and gauge the impact these have on the overall business.

Dawson was instrumental in organizing the In-Store Implementation Sharegroup and a contributor to its 2008 working paper. He is preparing a new paper, “Plan Through Impact,” that outlines his point of view regarding the next wave of innovation in supermarket store operations, one he believes opens up great opportunities to improve both shopper experience and financial performance.

TT: Warren, you’ve earned a long-standing reputation as one of the visionaries in supermarket merchandising, especially space and assortment management. What’s driving you to speak out again about merchandising compliance?

WD: It’s no secret that I’ve been an advocate along these lines for many years. I started working on the core issues of store-level item distribution in the 1980s. I’ve had the opportunity to help many supermarket and CPG companies tackle space and assortment issues since then. The idea behind the ISI group was to bring together a credible group of companies and industry people to debunk the myth that all is well with In-Store Implementation.

While we’ve seen improvement in supply chain methods, category planning and demand-based insights, the in-store opportunity remains vast – tens of billions of dollars in missed sales, billions in profits. As the ISI Sharegroup working paper showed in 2008, we have barely budged in 20 years on core issues like item availability, promotion compliance, speed to shelf and planogram integrity. I think we have the means to fix those things today.

TT: What do you mean by “Plan Through Impact”?

WD: Well, besides persistent irritants like out-of-stocks and poor promotion compliance, two areas of change in merchandising planning in the grocery industry have brought this need to a higher urgency: The first is Shopper Marketing, which has led to a much greater degree of segmentation and targeting around in-store merchandising and messaging. The second is the adoption of planogram automation tools, which permit retailers to vary merchandising plans down to the store level, if justified by shopper insights.

TT: Those sound like positive developments. Are you skeptical about their value?

WD: Not at all. It’s great, must-do stuff. The challenge is that they introduce an enormous amount of additional intricacy that the industry is not well-prepared to manage. Retailers and CPGs are getting a lot better at formulating subtle and insightful plans, but they lack the know-how and every-day practices to carry those plans out effectively in the stores. There’s a huge risk of wasted spending.

TT: Isn’t that what Workforce Management and Store Execution Management software is supposed to address?

WD: Yes in theory. And these types of tools are likely to be parts of the Merchandising Resource Management solution I envision. They let us formulate a compliance plan and push it out to people in the field. But organizing and communicating tasks is just the first step in the process. There has to be a process for confirming that the tasks get done, measuring them and comparing them to expectation. And you have to be able to share the results to all participants in the process, so they can manage their own performance.

TT: Sounds a lot like the “Plan-Do-Measure” concept advanced by the ISI Network.

WD: Exactly right, although MRM goes further. You need an embedded feedback loop to monitor compliance. Regularity in the information will ultimately help trading partners make better, more realistic merchandising and promotion plans. It’s foolish and costly to plan work that doesn’t get done, and yet that’s what we do every day, because without measurement tools we can’t visualize how our unrealistic plans damage our business outcomes.

TT: So how does “Plan Through Impact” extend this thought process?

WD: By adding three more levels of measurement. Its core is what I call a Compliance Index that synthesizes several store-level metrics into a score that can be rolled up from the item level all the way to the category, cluster or account level. Then compliance must be linked to what we all care about – sales performance results. Finally, we need to connect the dots to measures of business impact – customer experience and loyalty, competitive position, and shareholder value. I sometimes like to call this “Plan-Do-Measure-Measure-Measure-Measure.”

TT: Are you suggesting that we establish a chain of causality connecting a company’s shareholder value all the way back to its merchandising competency?

WD: I believe it’s an achievable goal. Merely tracking merchandising outcomes doesn’t provide a reliable proxy for business performance. We feel intuitively that compliance must have an impact, but we can’t use it to support strategic decisions unless we establish a Plan Through Impact framework.

TT: Sounds challenging. Aren’t you asking for too much?

WD: At one time this might have seemed beyond us, or at least prohibitively costly, but today we have all the elements within our grasp. There’s no shortage of tools to support store level measurement and communications. In fact, many merchandising field organizations are already heavily invested in portable technology with verifiable self-reporting that would support a viable compliance index. Then there are the point solutions for digital image analysis, out-of-stock detection, spot audits, and demand signal analysis to name a few.

TT: If those software and hardware tools are already available, why isn’t the industry already enjoying greater success?

WD: Because they are being put into use ad hoc, and in the absence of a crucial thoughtware layer. Merchandising Resource Management is a business process, not a technology. It requires some changes in business practices at the store level, as well as for decision-makers and administrators. Also, because it creates greater transparency of compliance performance, it has potential to change the way trading partners collaborate for success. Most companies are going to need a little help putting this into practice.

TT: How can companies educate themselves further about this?

WD: Interested parties are welcome to email me at WarrenDawson@gmail.com for a copy of the paper or to discuss a consultation. A good place to begin reading is the In-Store Implementation Network site. Many downloads are available with free registration.

© Copyright 2009 James Tenser

Curing Performance Anxiety

Click to Learn MoreSure, you can plan alright, but how well can you implement?

I imagine this question keeps truly conscious merchants and consumer product marketers awake nights with what amounts to performance anxiety.

Those of you who follow the work of the In-Store Implementation Network may be well aware that members regard the pursuit of retail compliance as nothing less than an industry imperative. Our latest work on Merchandising Performance Management drives the point further. Our not-so-hidden agenda: Shift the dialog from hand-wringing about our challenges to identifying and implementing practical solutions.

You see, we are standing at the threshold of the next (maybe the last) great opportunity for retail financial performance gains – the stores themselves.

The past two decades of industry consolidation, supply chain advances and category management have failed to move the needle on basic merchandising performance indicators such as out-of-stock rates, promotion compliance and planogram compliance and decay. The numbers remain so disheartening that we routinely plan not to measure them. This despite their obvious causal link to GMROII and profits.
Click to Learn More
Here is evidence of what I call “dis-economies of scale.” It should be a source of more than a little vexation across the retail consumer products industry. Top executives know with certainty that buying clout and elimination of redundant processes are competitive necessities, but they prefer not to call attention to the fact that larger strings of larger stores are also much harder to steer.

Today’s fast-moving consumer goods chains teeter along the precipice of the “big middle” – the cold, dark place of persistent merchandising mediocrity ruled by a mythical, but non-existent, average shopper. Never fear – we’ve got Shopper Marketing to keep us from the abyss. We segment and target our customer base, and we study our targets, so we derive insights about our shoppers and make plans to reach them on their terms.

Those shopper insights let us design offers tailored to specific shopper groups. They are also inputs for automated planogram tools that let us design tailored merchandising plans for each category in each store. We can layer on store-specific pricing, using the latest optimization technologies, and before long we’ve defined thousands of store-specific matrices of space, mix, price points and deals.

Yes we have some impressively intricate plans, but can we implement them? Well, there’s a dizzying amount of detail to cover, but realistic solutions may finally be at hand.

Retailers, manufacturers, brokers and merchandising services organizations have recognized for some time that they need a systematic way to parcel out the tasks to their minions in the field. That has led to a proliferation of home-grown and commercial Work Force Management (WFM) software solutions that permit headquarters to push instructions out to the individuals tasked with performing them.

WFM solutions are generally one-way (HQ to the field) and intra-organizational with an emphasis on employee management. That is, they permit managers to send instructions to their own people in the field without provision for feedback. Often those instructions arrive in the form of an email or memo.

Expanding the WFM principles more specifically to the retail environment has led to shift in focus from managing people to managing activities. Solutions of this type are called Store Execution Management (SEM), and they are oriented toward field force automation and task or process efficiency. A number of third-party MSOs and direct store delivery organizations deploy SEM solutions today. As a rule these too are intra-organizational, with limited feedback possible for the host retailer.

Now we are seeing a new class of solutions reach the market, of a type I like to call Merchandising Performance Management (MPM). They are distinct from legacy WFM and SEM solutions in several important ways. First, they are engineered to manage outcomes, not just tasks or people. Because they incorporate a two-way platform for feedback and reporting, they support capture of performance metrics in real time.

Second, they are inter-organizational by design. That is, they support interaction from all the parties who plan merchandising and who touch the merchandise in stores – retailers, manufacturers, MSOs, brokers. This is most commonly accomplished through establishment of a secure, Web-based portal that is accessible as an online service. As a result, all parties in the merchandising ecosystem view relevant performance data and contribute required feedback to the greater information flow.

Presently there are at least eight solution providers who offer MPM software and services to the retail market. Several are early-stage companies and relatively untested. None are perfect. All hold out the promise of a practical, every-day, plan-do-measure store compliance discipline that can find hidden profit in the stores – where it all started.

Intricacy is the enemy. Most of what we try to do is not that hard. But there is so much detail to cover and those details are so … relentless. Performance anxiety must inevitably follow.

Unless… We adopt sound Merchandising Performance Management practices. ISI Network has assembled a report that outlines some tools and options for senior executives. I encourage you to take a look. It’s good for what ails us.

© Copyright 2009 James Tenser

Bookmark and Share

RFID’s Widening Gyre

TWO RECENT NEWS ITEMS about retail giants, radio-frequency ID tags and promotional displays have pundits punning and some market vultures vultching:

When Procter & Gamble declared it would no longer apply EPC/RFID tags to promotional displays built for Walmart stores, it triggered critiques of the technology and its underlying economics. Observers circling above the decaying carcass of the program sniffed that just maybe, Walmart wasn’t delivering a measurable benefit from the solution.

Within days Walgreen Drug Stores delivered a more positive spin, stating that the very same sort of radio-frequency tags had helped it improve its in‐store execution in the past year “to nearly double the industry average.”

Never mind that the industry average stinks like carrion.

David Van Howe, vice president of purchasing for Walgreens, called the information captured from the tagged displays a “game changer” for the chain, and at least one partner, Revlon, said the program delivered “unprecedented insight into what works and what doesn’t with consumers.”

So what are we to take away from all this? The vultures in our midst keep trying to declare retail RFID dead on arrival. The tech pundits claim they have seen a glorious future in those tiny transponders. I say the misdirected focus on RFID technology threatens to derail an important initiative.

It’s not the tech, it’s the practice! RFID has been ascribed with magical status by some, but I’m here to tell you – it’s no tri-corder, not even a silver bullet.

When it comes to at-retail compliance – potentially the largest business improvement opportunity presently facing the retail consumer products industry – point solutions are pointless. The system of practices is everything.

P&G’s decision exemplifies the frustration held by many manufacturers with In-Store Implementation of promotions. There is no routine, repeatable, measured and collaborative practice to execute planned promotions in stores. Data on compliance, if available at all, arrives weeks or months after the fact and it reveals that roughly half the spending is ineffective.

Even the mighty Walmart, it seems, has so far been unable to master this challenge on behalf of its trading partners. It means that billions of dollars in trade and promotional funds are badly spent while we debate which brand of ID code to attach to the display headers.

When it comes to optimizing In-Store Implementation, grease pencils and clipboards may be plenty of tech if the process is right. The retailer that formulates a compliance plan, enables it with appropriate solutions, and measures its outcome relentlessly will always achieve better performance on in-store programs. This is equally true for off-shelf display compliance, resets, planogram maintenance, new-product cut-ins, sampling programs, or floor polishing.

Of course large chains like the two Wals require some tools to help manage scale and stabilize best practices. For fixtures and displays, RFID may in fact be a useful input to the process. But it works at Walgreens because it has also instituted the in-store practices to make it work.

For the past two years, the In-Store Implementation Network has advocated establishment of a fully collaborative “plan-do-measure” retail compliance discipline that would ensure real-time visibility and accountability. We cannot improve what we do not measure. Retailers – and that includes even the likes of Walmart and Walgreens – must step forward on this issue if we are to see real progress on retail effectiveness and shopper experience.

© Copyright 2009 James Tenser

Bookmark and Share